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See Chapuis 2000; see also Gupta 2000.1
I think this holds, for example, of the supervaluation treatment modeled on Kripke 19752
and of the revision theory S . For S , see §5D of Nuel Belnap’s and my book The Revision Theory* *
of Truth (henceforth cited as RTT).
In this essay I shall be concerned only with circular definitions of predicates. Indeed,3
most of the essay will be devoted to monadic definitions. The principal results stated below hold
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A finite circular definition is a particularly simple kind of circular definition. The content of a
circular definition is given by a revision process that the definition generates. Finite circular
definitions are those that have finite revision processes: the process of revision is complete, in the
sense made precise below, in finitely many stages. Finite circular definitions prove to be useful in
at least two ways. First, as André Chapuis has shown, they can be used to construct theories of
rational choice for certain kinds of games. The resulting theories improve on earlier ones in some
important respects.  Second, in view of their relatively simple behavior, finite circular definitions1
provide a testing ground for alternative treatments of circularity and interdependency. Some
treatments that are otherwise attractive become distinctly less plausible when they are applied to
finite circular definitions.  2
My aim in this essay is to record some properties of finite circular definitions. I show that
finiteness of a definition is not, in general, effectively decidable (Theorem 5, below). However,
first-order finite circular definitions are effectively enumerable (Theorem 15). I show also that
finite definitions do not add to the expressive power of the language (Theorem 14). Maricarmen
Martinez has shown that if a first-order circular definition is built using at most identity, names,
and one-place predicates then it is bound to be finite. I outline a proof of this claim (Theorem 18);
a detailed proof may be found in Martinez 2001.
Let us begin with some basic concepts and terminology. Let L be a first-order language, with or
without identity. I shall assume that L is equipped with an effective enumeration of its non-logical
constants. Let R by an n-ary predicate that does not occur in L. Let L  be the language that+
results when L is extended with R. D is a definition (possibly circular) of R in L iff D is of the
form,
1 n Df 1 nR(x , . . . , x )  =   A(x , . . . , x , R),
1 n 1 nwhere A(x , . . . , x , R) is a formula of L  and has no variables free in it other than x , . . . , x . R+
1 nis the definiendum of D, and A(x , . . . , x , R) is its definiens. A definition whose definiendum is a
one-place (two-place, n-place) predicate will be called a monadic (dyadic, n-adic) definition.  A3
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for systems of interdependent definitions, provided that their definienda are finite in number.
Further, circular and interdependent definitions can be given for names and function symbols also.
The theory of these definitions parallels that of predicates.
I shall often suppress the parenthetical clause.4
The general theory of definition requires consideration of transfinite revision sequences.5
In this paper, we shall need to consider only revision sequences that are at most ù-long.
structure or model M (= <D, I>), where D is the domain of M and I provides interpretations for
the non-logical constants of L, will sometimes be called a ground model of L. L itself will
sometimes be called a ground language. Subsets h of D  will be called hypotheses (for then
interpretation of R in M).  Given a ground model M and a hypothesis h, M + h is the structure (of4
L ) just like M except that R is assigned the interpretation h. Given a ground model M, D yields a+
,M ,MD Drule of revision ä  that is defined thus: ä  is a function from D  into D  such that, for all h fn n
D ,n
1 n ,M 1 n 1 nD<d , . . . , d > 0 ä (h) iff <d , . . . , d > satisfies A(x , . . . , x , R) in M + h.
M ,MDSometimes, when the context allows it, I shall drop the subscript D and write ä  in place of ä .
i 0 # i ,MDA revision rule yields revision sequences: <h>  is a revision sequence for D in M [or for ä ]
i+1 ,M i i 0 # i < j ,MD Diff, for all i $0, h  = ä (h ); similarly for j-long sequences  <h> .  ä (h) is the hypothesis5 n
,M ,M ,MD D Dthat results after n successive applications of ä  to h. So, ä (h) = h, and ä (h) =0 n+1
,M ,M ,M ,MD D D Dä (ä (h)). A hypothesis h is p-reflexive for D in M [or for ä ] iff h = ä (h); h is reflexiven p
,M ,M ,MD D Dfor D in M [or for ä ] iff, for some p > 0, h is p-reflexive for ä . Observe that if ä (h) isn
,MDreflexive then, for all m $ n, ä (h) is reflexive also. We can now define the central concept:m
1. Definition. Let D be a definition in a language L. Then, D is finite in L iff, for all ground
,MDmodels M of L there is a number n such that for all hypotheses h, ä (h) is reflexive.n
Note the order of quantifiers in this definition: Mnh. We shall see below that, for first-order
languages, the order of the quantifiers can be switched (Corollary 11). That is, the following three
conditions are equivalent:
,MD Mnh[ä (h) is reflexive],n
,MD nMh[ä (h) is reflexive],n
,MD Mhn[ä (h) is reflexive].n
We shall also see that, for a finite definition D, a bound p can be placed on the cyclicity exhibited
by reflexive hypotheses: any reflexive hypothesis for D in any model is bound to be q-reflexive for
some q such that 0 < q # p. The revision process for a finite definition is complete, then, after
finitely many stages: only finitely many stages are needed to isolate all the reflexive hypotheses.
These hypotheses play a central role in the semantics of finite definitions.
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The notion of validity defined here is equivalent to validity under the system S  of RTT,6 #
except that S  treats all definitions, finite and non-finite. In this paper, our topic is essentially S# #
restricted to finite definitions.
This is Example 5A.11 from RTT.7
2. Definitions.  Let D be a finite definition in L, M (=  <D, I>) a ground model of L, Z f D, B a
sentence of L , and C(x) a formula of L .+ +
(2.1)  B is valid in M relative to D iff, for all hypotheses h reflexive for D in M, B is true in M + h;
B is valid (simpliciter) relative to D iff B is valid relative to D in all ground models.6
(2.2)  C(x) weakly defines Z in M relative to D iff C(x) has exactly one free variable x and, for all
d 0 D, d 0 Z iff, for all reflexive hypotheses h for D in M, C(x) is true of d in M + h. C(x) strongly
defines Z in M relative to D iff C(x) and ¬C(x) weakly define, respectively, Z and  D \ Z in M
relative to D. Z is weakly definable in M relative to D iff there a formula of L  that weakly defines+
Z in M relative to D; similarly for strong definability.
Remark. The above explanation of validity is cogent only for finite definitions, not for definitions
in general. If the explanation were extended to all definitions, it would result in violations of the
conservativeness requirement on definitions (see RTT, §5A).
3. Examples. 
(3.1) Every non-circular definition – i.e., definition whose definiens contains no occurrences of
the definiendum – is finite. 
(3.2) An example of a circular definition that is finite is this:
DfGx  =  [x = a v (Ga w Gb)] w [x = b v ¬Ga v ¬Gb].7
Let a and b denote respectively the objects a and b in the domain of a ground model. The revision
rule for the above definition revises any hypothesis that contains either a or b to {a}, and it
revises all other hypotheses to {b}. The definition is plainly finite: by the second stage of revision
we are bound to have the 1-reflexive hypothesis {a}. {a} is thus the unique reflexive hypothesis,
and Ga is valid. Observe that ¬Gb is valid in those ground model in which a and b are distinct, but
not in those in which they are identical. Thus ¬Gb is not valid simpliciter. Observe also that weak
definability coincides with first-order definability in the ground model.
(3.3)  Consider the definition
DfRxy  =  z(Rxz v Rzy).
This definition is pure in the sense that it uses no non-logical vocabulary from the ground
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The subscript ‘r’ indicates that the rules are designed for revision semantics and that they8
are restricted versions of the classical rules.
Note that A(t, G) is the result of replacing free occurrences of x in A(x, G) by the term t,9
with the proviso that bound variables in A(x, G) are so changed that the substituted occurrences
language. Consider any ground model with the set N of natural numbers as it domain. The
i 0 # i 0revision sequence <h> , where h  is the successor relation {<z, z+1>: z 0 N}, is plainly non-
repeating. Hence, no hypothesis in the sequence is reflexive. So our definition is not finite.
U(3.4)  Consider the ordered field of real numbers U and its associated language L , which
contains the constants 0, 1, +, ×, #. Let Closure abbreviate the formula
G0 v x(Gx 6 Gx+1).
Set D to be the following monadic definition:
DfGx  =  [¬Closure v x = x] w [Closure v Gx].
Observe that if an hypothetical interpretation of G fails to satisfy Closure then the revision rule
revises it to the entire domain; otherwise, the revision rule leaves the initial hypothesis unchanged.
Therefore D is finite. Further, it has in U uncountably many reflexive hypotheses: any hypothesis
that satisfies closure is 1-reflexive. Neither the sentence
z(z  0 v z  1 v 0 # z # 1 v Gz)
nor its negation is, therefore, valid in U. But the sentences G0, G1, x(Gx 6 Gx+1) are valid in U
and, indeed, in all ground models. The set N of natural numbers is weakly definable in U. But N is
not first-order definable in U. For, if it were so definable then the first-order theory of U would
end up being undecidable, contradicting a theorem of Alfred Tarski. We shall see below that any
set that is strongly definable in a structure by a finite definition is definable already in the ground
language. It follows that N is not strongly definable.
0 0There is a natural calculus, C , for reasoning with finite definitions. C  is a natural deduction
system and has the classical introduction and elimination rules for connectives and quantifiers.
0 rFurther, C  has two special rules for definitions: Definiendum Introduction (DfI ) and
rDefiniendum Elimination (DfE ).  These rules are weaker than the standard rules for the8
0definitions, in the following way. Each step in a derivation in C  is assigned an integer as its index.
Intuitively, this index may be viewed as representing a stage in the revision process. An
r rapplications of DfI  or DfE  results in a shift in this index. Suppose, for example, that we have the
definition
DfGx  =  A(x, G).
r rThen given A(t, G) at a step with an index i, DfI  allows us to infer Gt with the index i+1.  DfE  is9
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of x are free for t.
0The calculus C  is not sound if finite definitions are evaluated using the supervaluation10
scheme in the manner of Kripke 1975. A counterexample is provided by the definition given in
Example 3.2: sentences Ga and ¬Gb are not grounded truths (i.e., they are not true in the least
ofixed point supervaluation model), but they are provable in C .
Question: Is there a natural sound and complete calculus for finite definitions under the
supervaluation semantics?
the converse of this: from Gt with the index i+1 it allows us to infer A(t, G) with the index i.
0There is one special rule governing indices in C , the rule of Index Shift: the indices of formulas
without any occurrences of the definienda can be arbitrarily shifted. Aside from these three rules –
r r 0DfE , DfI , and Index Shift –, no other rules of C  involve shifting of indices. This is so, in
particular, for the introduction and elimination rule for connectives and quantifiers. The rule for
Conjunction Introduction, for example, is this: given formulas B and C, both with the index i, we
0may infer (B & C) with the index i. A sentence A is derivable from a definition D in C  iff for
0some integer i there is a derivation in C  of A with the index i from D. For a more detailed
0presentation of C  and for sample derivations, see RTT, §5B.
4. Theorem. (Soundness and completeness) A sentence B of L  is valid relative to a finite+
0definition D iff B is derivable in C  from D.
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of Theorem 5B.1 of  RTT : Validity, as defined above, is
0 0equivalent, over finite definitions, to validity in the system S  of RTT. And C  is sound and
0complete with respect to S .          ~ 
Finite definitions have, then, not only a simple semantics but also a simple calculus. It is this that
makes them a useful tool in theorizing about phenomena involving circularity and interdependency
(e.g., truth and rational choice). I know of no other semantic treatment of finite definitions that
simultaneously preserves classical logic, avoids hierarchies, and at the same time comes with a
natural calculus.  10
In view of their model behavior, it is a natural question whether finite definitions can be
characterized in a non-semantical way. More specifically, can we somehow separate out those
definientia A(x, G) that yield finite definitions from those that do not?
5. Theorem. There is no effective method for deciding whether a monadic definition in the
ùlanguage of arithmetic L  is finite.
Proof.  Consider the theory Q of Robinson’s Arithmetic. As is well known, all recursive functions
and relations are representable in Q. Consider a recursive binary relation R(x, y) such that  
yR(x, y) is not recursive. For instance, R(x, y) may be the relation that y is the Gödel number of
ùa proof in Q of a formula with Gödel number x. Let A(u, v) be a formula of L  that represents
R(x, y). For all natural numbers p and q, we have therefore the following:
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Q(1) If R(p, q) holds then |  A(p, q),
and
Q(2) If R(p, q) fails then |  ¬A(p, q),
ùwhere bold p and q indicate numerals in L  for p and q respectively.
nWe prove the theorem by constructing effectively, for each natural number n, a definition D  such
that
n(*) yR(n, y) holds iff D  is finite.
nSince the construction of D  is effective, (*) suffices to establish the theorem: if there were an
effective procedure for deciding whether a definition is finite, there would be an effective
procedure for deciding whether a number satisfied yR(x, y). But this latter is, by hypothesis,
impossible.
nWe construct the definitions D  as follows. Let Q abbreviate the conjunction of the axioms of
Robinson’s Arithmetic and let B abbreviate the formula
(B) zy(Gz v y # z v A(n, y)),
where # is defined thus:
y # z : u(u + y = z).
nThen D  is:
n Df(D ) Gx  =  Q v ¬B v [x = 0 w y(Gy v x = y')].
n MLet the rule of revision generated by D  in an interpretation M be ä . It is easy to see that, for
arbitrary interpretation M and arbitrary hypothesis h,
M(3) If Q is false in M then ä (h) = i.
M(4) If B is true in M + h, then ä (h) = i.
Further, for the standard model of arithmetic ù and for arbitrary hypothesis h,
ù(5) If B is false in ù+h then ä (h) = {0} c {p' | p 0 h}.
MWe shall describe the behavior of ä  in nonstandard models of Q below. Let us now verify that
(*) holds.
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(} part) Suppose R(n,  y) holds for no natural number y. By (2), A(n, m) is false in ù for all
numbers m. Hence, for any arbitrary hypothesis h, B is bound to be false in ù + h. So (5) applies,
and we have
ùä (h) = {0} c {p' | p 0 h}.
ùThe following is therefore a revision sequence of ä :
i, {0}, {0, 1}, {0, 1, 2}, . . . .
nNone of the hypotheses in this sequence is reflexive. Hence, D  fails to be finite.
(| part) Suppose R(n, y) holds for some natural number y. Let m be the least such number. We
claim that for all M and h,
M(#) ä (h) is reflexive.m+1
nThis suffices to show that D  is finite. 
MNow if Q is false in M then, by (3), ä (h) = i for all h. It follows that i is reflexive and that (#)
holds. So we need only verify (#) for those M in which Q is true. Note that such an M may be a
nonstandard model of Q and may contain in its domain objects other than (copies of) the natural
numbers. We know, however, that theorems of Q are true in M. Note in particular the following:
Q(Fact A) |  p  q, if p  q,
Q(Fact B) |  x(x # p : x = 0 w . . . w x = p), for all p,
Q(Fact C) |  x(x # p w p # x), for all p.
Fact A tells us that the denotations in M of 0, 0', 0'', .  . . , p, . . . are all distinct from each other.
Call these denotations the standard numbers of M and call all the other objects in the domain of
M the nonstandard numbers of M. Let p be the denotation of p in M. Let us now consider how
the objects in M are ordered by the interpretation of # in M. Call this interpretation #*. Fact B
tells us that
p #* q  iff p # q.
That is, the standard numbers are ordered in the standard way in M. What about the nonstandard
numbers? By Fact C, every nonstandard number is either above or below any given standard
number p. It cannot be below, for then (by Fact B) it would be identical to one of the standard
numbers, which is impossible. Hence, the nonstandard numbers are greater than all the standard
numbers. We thus have the following picture:
0 #* 1 #* 2 #* 3 #*  . . . #*   the nonstandard numbers.
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Now, by our assumption, m is the least number for which R(n, y) holds. Hence, by (1) and (2), we
have
Q Q|  A(n, m) and, for all p < m, |  ¬A(n, p).
Consequently, A(n, m) is true in M and, for all p < m, A(n, p) is false in M. This, in conjunction
with the properties we have noted of the models of Q, yields that
(6) B is false in M + h iff h f {q | q < m}.
nHence, by definition D ,
M(7) If h f {q | q < m} then ä (h) = {0} c {p' | p 0 h}.
Observe that, by (4), (6), and (7),
M(8) ä (h) = i iff  h é {q | q < m}.
MNow consider the revision sequence generated by ä  when the initial hypothesis is i. By (7) and
(8), the sequence looks like this:
i, {0}, {0, 1}, {0, 1, 2}, . . . . , {0, 1, . . . m}, i.
So i is reflexive. And (#) holds for M when h is i. What if h is nonempty? Now, if  h é {q | q <
Mm} then, by (8), ä (h) = i. And again (#) holds. Suppose, on the other hand, that h f {q | q < m}.
Now all members of h are standard numbers of M, and there must be one that is the greatest
M(under #* ordering). Let this be p. By (7), p + 1 0 ä (h). More generally, it follows by induction
that, for all q # m - p,
M p + q 0 ä (h).q
MIn particular, m 0 ä  (h). That is,m-p
Mä  (h) é {q | q < m}. m-p
M MSo, by (8), ä  (h) = i. Hence ä  (h) is reflexive. Since (m - p) + 1 # m + 1, claim (#)(m-p)+1 (m-p)+1
holds again. ~ 
Remarks. (i) A small modification of the above argument yields a stronger result: the
undecidability of finite monadic definitions in any first-order language L with identity and a binary
predicate. Treat the binary predicate as set-theoretic membership and conduct the above argument
not with Q but with the finitely many axioms of ZFC needed to derive the translations of the
axioms of Q. The problem of deciding whether a number belongs to an r.e. set can be reduced, as
above, to the problem of deciding whether a monadic definition in L is finite. 
(ii) José Martinez has observed that the claim holds also for first-order languages L' with
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just one binary predicate R. Conduct the argument given in (i) with R as set-theoretic membership
and with indiscernibility in place of identity, where indiscernibility (.) is defined thus:
Dfx . y =  z(zRx : zRy) v z(xRz : yRz).
(iii) A simple argument establishes the undecidability of finite dyadic definitions in the
language L' of (ii). Let S be a binary predicate distinct from R and let A be a sentence of L'. Then
the definition
DfSxy  =  ¬A v z(Sxz v Szy)
is finite if and only if A is a logical truth of L'. Since logical truth is not effectively decidable, the
same holds for finite dyadic definitions.
6. Problem. Is there an effective method for deciding whether a pure dyadic definition in a first-
order language (with or without identity) is finite?
We shall show that monadic finite definitions in a first-order language are recursively enumerable.
As a step in this argument, we show that for these definitions there is a finite bound by which
revision reaches reflexive hypotheses irrespective of the ground model and the initial hypothesis.
Furthermore, there is similar bound on the length of the cycle that reflexive hypotheses exhibit.
The following terminology will prove useful.
7. Definitions. A natural number m is an initial number of D iff m is the least number such that,
,MDfor all ground models M and all hypotheses h, ä (h) is reflexive. A natural number n is a cyclicm
number of D iff n is the least number such that, for all ground models M and all reflexive
,MDhypothesis h of ä , h is p-reflexive for some p such that 0 < p # n. A pair <m, n> is a revision
index of D iff m is the initial number and n the cyclic number of D.
We show that every finite definition has a revision index. But first a preliminary definition and a
lemma.
8. Definition. A definition D has an ù-long [n-long] non-repeating revision sequence iff there is
,M 0 # q ,M 0 # q < nD Da ground model M and a hypothesis h such that, the sequence <ä (h)>  [<ä (h)> ] isq q
,M ,MD Dnon-repeating – in other words, for all i, j < ù [i, j < n], if i  j, then ä (h)  ä (h).i j
9. Lemma. If a definition D has, for each p, a p-long non-repeating revision sequence then D has
an ù-long non-repeating revision sequence.
Proof. Suppose D is a definition, say,
1 m Df 1 mG(x , . . . , x )  =  A(x , . . . , x , G),
that has, for each p, a p-long non-repeating revision sequence. Consider a language L* just like
i ithe ground language L but with countably many new m-place predicates G  (0 # i). Let E
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designate the following formula of L*:
i 1 m i+1 1 m 1 m i(E ) x  . . . x (G (x , . . . , x ) : A(x , . . . , x , G ))
iAnd let C  designate the formula,
i 1 m i+1 1 m 0 1 m(C ) ¬x  . . . x (G (x , . . . , x ) : G (x , . . . , x )) v 
1 m i+1 1 m 1 1 m¬x  . . . x (G (x , . . . , x ) : G (x , . . . , x )) v 
.
.
.
1 m i+1 1 m i 1 m¬x  . . . x (G (x , . . . , x ) : G (x , . . . , x )).
nRecursively define theories Ã  thus:
0Ã  = i
n+1 n n nÃ  = Ã  c {E , C }.
0 # n n n 0Set Ã = ^ Ã . We show that each Ã  is consistent. Ã  is obviously consistent; hence we may
suppose that n > 0. We know that D has an (n+1)-long non-repeating revision sequence. So there
,M o # i # nDis a ground model M and a hypothesis h such that <ä (h)>  is non-repeating. Let M +i
,M o # iD<ä (h)>  (= M*) be the model of L* that agrees with M on the constants in L and that assignsi
i ,M iDto each G  the interpretation ä (h). Plainly, each E  is true in M*, and, for each j such that 0 # ji
j n< n, so also is C . We conclude therefore that each Ã  is consistent. By the Compactness Theorem,
Ã is consistent as well.
Since Ã is consistent, there is a model of L* in which all members of Ã are true. This model can be
i i # 0 i irepresented as M + <h> , where M is a ground model and h  is the interpretation of G . Since
i i i # 0 i i # 0 ieach C  is true in M + <h> , <h>  is a non-repeating sequence. Since each E  is true in M +
i i # 0 i i # 0 ,MD<h> , <h>  is a revision sequence generated by ä . It follows that D has an ù-long non-
repeating revision sequence.         ~ 
This lemma yields the desired theorem.
10. Theorem. Every finite definition D has a revision index.
Proof. Suppose, for reductio, that a finite definition D fails to have an initial number. Hence, for
,MDevery natural number p, there is a ground model M and an hypothesis h such that ä (h) is notp
,M 0 # q # p ,MD Dreflexive. It follows that <ä (h)>  is a non-repeating revision sequence of ä . Hence, byq
the previous lemma, D has an ù-long non-repeating revision sequence. This violates the finiteness
of D. A parallel argument shows that D has a cyclic number. It follows that D has a revision index. 
                                                                                                                                     ~ 
11. Corollary. The following three conditions define the same notion of finiteness for first-order
languages:
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,MD(i)  nMh[ä (h) is reflexive],n
,MD(ii)  Mnh[ä (h) is reflexive],n
,MD(iii)  Mhn[ä (h) is reflexive].n
Proof. An argument parallel to the one for Theorem 10 shows that (iii) implies (i), and this
suffices to establish the corollary.        ~
Remark. The above equivalences hold because of the compactness property of first-order
languages; they fail to hold for second-order languages.
The next lemma and theorem hold for n-adic definitions generally. For notational simplicity, I
state them for monadic definitions only. Let D be the following definition:
DfGx  =  A(x, G).
12. Definition. Set:
A (x, G) = Gx,0
A (x, G) = A (x, G)[A(t, G)/ Gt],n+1 n
where A (x, G)[A(t, G)/ Gt] is the result of substituting A(t, G) for all occurrences of Gt in   n
A (x, G).n
13. Lemma. Let M be a ground model, h an arbitrary hypothesis, and d arbitrary member of the
,MDdomain of M. Then, d satisfies A (x, G) in M + h iff d 0 ä (h).         ~ n n
14. Theorem. If D is finite then all sets that are strongly definable in a ground model M are also
first-order definable in M.
Proof. Let C(x, G) be a formula (of L ) that strongly defines a set Z in M relative to D. Let h be+
an arbitrary reflexive hypothesis for D in M. Then, for all d in the domain of M,
d 0 Z iff C(x, G) is true of d in M + h.
,MDSince, D is finite, there is a number n such that ä (i) is reflexive. Let C*(x, G) be the formulan
that results by substituting all occurrences of Gt in C(x, G) by A (t, G). Further, let C**(x) be then
formula of L that results from replacing all occurrences of Gt in C*(x, G) by z (or any other
logically false sentence). We have, in virtue of the substitution theorems of first-order logic, that
,MDd 0 Z iff C(x, G) is true of d in M + ä (i),n
iff C*(x, G) is true of d in M + i,
iff C**(x) is true of d in M.
Thus C**(x) defines Z in M. That is, Z is first-order definable in M.                    ~ 
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In another sense – that captured by weak definability – they do add to expressive power.11
Remark. In one sense, then, finite definitions do not add to the expressive power of the ground
language.  In contrast, non-finite definitions do add to expressive power: they allow sets to be11
strongly definable that are not first-order definable. This contrast reflects another contrast: the
logic of finite definitions is axiomatizable, but that of non-finite definitions, as Philip Kremer
(1993) has shown, is not axiomatizable. The failure of axiomatizability is a direct consequence of
the expressive power that non-finite definitions bring with them.
15. Theorem. Finite monadic definitions are recursively enumerable.
Proof. For all number n and all numbers m  > 0, set K(D, n, m) to be the following formula:
x(A (x, G) : A (x, G)) w n n+1
x(A (x, G) : A (x, G)) w n n+2
.
.
.
x(A (x, G) : A (x, G)).n n+m
Lemma 13 implies that, for all ground models M and hypotheses h,
,MD(1) K(D, n, m) is true in M + h iff ä (h) is q-reflexive, for some q such that 0 < q # m.n
This yields the following crucial fact:
(2) K(D, n, m) is a logical truth iff D is a finite definition with an index <p, q> such that p # n
and q # m.
Argument for (2): (| part) Suppose that K(D, n, m) is a logical truth, and consider an arbitrary
,MDground model M and an arbitrary hypothesis h. By (1), ä (h) is q-reflexive, for some q such thatn
0 < q # m. Further, for every reflexive hypothesis h' there is an hypothesis h'' such that h' =
,MDä (h''). It follows that D has an index <p, q> such that p # n and q # m.n
(} part) Suppose D has an index <p, q>, p # n and q # m, and consider an arbitrary ground
, MDmodel M and hypothesis h. Now ä (h) is r-reflexive for some r such that 0 < r # q. Hence byn
(1), K(D, n, m) is true in M + h. Since M and h are arbitrary, K(D, n, m) is logically true.
Now, the four-place relation “Z is a proof of K(D, n, m)” is recursive. And by fact (2),
D is finite iff there is a Z, n, and m such that Z is proof of K(D, n, m).
Since the relation “proof of” is recursive, it follows that finite definitions are recursively
enumerable.         ~ 
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Remark. A generalization of the above argument shows that finite n-adic definitions are
recursively enumerable also.
16. Problem. Is there a natural syntactic characterization of finite monadic definitions?
This problem is made difficult by the fact that finite definitions are not closed under the usual
logical operations: ¬, 6, :, v, , etc. This is illustrated by the following examples. (Further
examples may be found in Martinez 2001.)
17. Examples.
(17.1) Let A(x, G) be the formula
Gb w x = b w y(Gy v Syx).
Then a definition of Gx with A(x, G) as definiens is finite: by the second stage of revision we
invariably obtain the entire domain as the revised hypothesis. But a definition with ¬A(x, G) as the
definiens is not finite. Consider the structure with natural numbers as the domain that interprets b
as 0 and S as the successor relation. The revision rule generates the following infinite revision
sequence.
i, N\{0}, {1}, N\{0, 2}, {1, 3}, N\{0, 2, 4}, {1, 3, 5} . . . .
Variants of this example show that finite definitions are not closed under 6, :, and . Both x  x
and A(x, G) yield finite definitions, but (A(x, G) 6 x  x) and (A(x, G) : x  x), being equivalent
to ¬A(x, G), fail to do so. Further, every instantiation of
z[Gz w x = z w y(Gy v Syx)]
with a closed term yields a finite definition, but the formula itself does not do so. This shows that
finite definitions are not closed under . Finally, observe that both x  x and (x  x 6 ¬A(x, G))
yield finite definitions but not ¬A(x, G). Hence, closure under modus ponens fails as well.
(17.2) The following two definiens
Gb w b = c w [x  c v (x = b w y(Gy v Syx)]
Gc w b = c w [x  b v (x = c w y(Gy v Syx)]
yield finite definitions but not their conjunction. Similar examples can be constructed to illustrate
the failure of closure under w and .
Maricarmen Martinez (2001) has investigated the closure properties of finite definitions. She has
established the following useful theorem.
18. Theorem. (Maricarmen Martinez) Let D be a monadic definition in a first-order language with
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identity. If the non-logical resources of D consist solely of names and one-place predicates, then D
is finite.
Outline of a proof. Let L be any first-order language with identity whose non-logical resources
include at most finitely many names and finitely many one-place predicates. The proof of the
theorem rests on two facts about L:
(i)   Any set or relation definable in a structure by a formula of L is also definable by a
quantifier-free formula of L.
(ii)   Only finitely many sets are definable in a structure by quantifier-free formulas of L.
Fact (i) can be established by a quantifier elimination argument. Fact (ii) is a consequence of the
finiteness of the non-logical resources of L. Now consider an arbitrary monadic definition D,
DfGx  =  A(x, G),
,MDin L, and an arbitrary ground model M and hypothesis h. By Lemma 13, ä (h) is definable in Mn
,MD+ h by A (x, G). It follows by fact (i) that ä (h) is definable in M + h by a quantifier-freen n
0 pformula of L  (= L c {G}). By fact (ii), only finitely many sets h , . . . , h  are definable in M + h+
by quantifier-free formulas of L . Hence,+
,M 0 pDä (h) 0 {h , . . . , h }.n
,MDIt follows that, for some q # p, ä (h) is reflexive. In view of Corollary 11, it follows that D isq
finite.           ~
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